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Abstract
We refine the interpolation property of the {∧,∨,¬}-fragment of classical
propositional logic, showing that if 2 ¬φ, 2 ψ and φ  ψ then there is an
interpolant χ, constructed using at most atomic formulas occurring in both
φ and ψ and negation, conjunction and disjunction, such that (i) φ entails χ
in Kleene’s strong three-valued logic and (ii) χ entails ψ in Priest’s Logic of
Paradox.
Keywords: Interpolation theorem for classical propositional logic ·Kleene’s
strong 3-valued logic · Priest’s Logic of Paradox
1 Introduction
Suppose that φ classically entails ψ, that φ is not a classical contradiction and
that ψ is not a classical tautology. Then φ and ψ must share non-logical vo-
cabulary, for else one could make φ true and ψ false at the same time. That
theremust be some overlap in non-logical vocabulary between premise and con-
clusion is obvious. Possession of the interpolation property takes this line of
thought much further:
If 2 ¬φ, 2 ψ and φ  ψ then there is a formula χ containing
only atomic formulas common to φ and ψ and such that φ  χ and
χ  ψ.1
1Surprisingly few textbooks prove this theorem. (Hodges 2001) and (Hunter 1971) are excep-
tions. They prove it in the slightly stronger form
if φ  ψ and at least one atomic formula is common to φ and ψ then there is a formula
χ containing only atomic formulas common to φ andψ and such that φ  χ and χ  ψ.
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Now, as iswell known,many logics fail to possess the interpolationproperty—
see, e.g., (Schumm 1986) and the references therein, (Renardel de Lavalette
1981), (Urquhart 1993), (Roorda 1994). On the other hand, many logics do share
the interpolation properties exhibited by classical propositional logic or close
analogues thereof. Two that do are Kleene’s strong three-valued logic (K3;
Kleene 1952, §64) and Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP ; Priest 1979). To be exact,
abbreviating ‘atomic formula’ to ‘atom’ we have
if φ 2K3 and φ K3 ψ then there is a formula χ containing only
atoms common to φ and ψ and such that φ K3 χ and χ K3 ψ2
and
if 2LP ψ and φ LP ψ then there is a formula χ containing only
atoms common to φ and ψ and such that φ LP χ and χ LP ψ.
That Kleene’s logic has this interpolation property was shown by Kamila Ben-
dová (2005).3 That Priest’s logic has the stated interpolation property follows
immediately via the Duality Principle that linksK3 and LP , namely,
¬φ K3 ¬ψ iff ψ LP φ and ¬φ K3 iff LP φ,
and the fact that Double Negation Introduction and Elimination are sound in
K3.4
AlthoughK3 and LP have the indicated interpolation properties which are
the minimal modifications of the classical case to, respectively, a logic without
2For a logicX , by φ X we mean that φ X ξ for all ξ and call φ an anti-theorem of the logicX .
Classically, φ  iff  ¬φ; inK3, φ K3 iff φ K3 ¬φ. LP has no anti-theorems.
3A proof that propositional K3 possesses the interpolation property, different in approach to
Bendová’s in that it is modelled on the proof for classical propositional logic in (Hunter 1971), is to
be found in the Appendix.
4The interpolation theorem for classical propositional logic is equivalent to the following: if ¬φ
and ψ are not classical tautologies but ¬φ ∨ ψ is then there is a formula χ containing only non-
logical vocabulary common to φ and ψ such that ¬φ∨ χ and ¬χ∨ψ are both classical tautologies.
Since all and only classical tautologies are theorems of the Logic of Paradox, we immediately obtain
one form of interpolation theorem for LP . But this does not translate back into the form given in
the text because, as Priest notes (Priest 1979, §III.9), LP lacks Disjunctive Syllogism.
Beall et al. (2013, p. 18, n. 5) say, ‘As the referee noted, Takano’s result in (Takano 1989) immedi-
ately delivers interpolation for LP .’ If so, it is in the form just noted, i.e., for theorems of LP of some
fixed logical form. Takano provides a condition that is sufficient on the assumption of expressive
completeness, namely, in the case of LP , that there be some function f : {0, 1/2, 1}2 → {0, 1/2, 1}
which satisfies the constraints (i) that, for any x, y, z ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}, if f(x, y) ≥ 1/2 and f(y, z) ≥ 1/2
then f(x, z) ≥ 1/2 and (ii) that, for all x, y ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}, f(x, y) ≥ 1/2 or f(y, x) ≥ 1/2. As is clear
from the truth-tables in Section 2 in the light of Lemma 1, any formula built up from atoms using
at most ∧,∨, and ¬ that expresses a function satisfying these constraints is a classical tautology in
two propositional variables and, classical tautologies being theorems of the Logic of Paradox, the
resulting “interpolation property” is entirely trivial.
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theorems (K3) and a logic without anti-theorems (LP ), it’s worth noting that
the logic whose valid inferences are exactly those common toK3 and LP does
not. This logic, called Kalman implication in (Makinson 1973), has neither the-
orems (since K3 has none) nor anti-theorems (since LP has none), but since
φ ∧ ¬φ is (classically hence) K3-unsatisfiable and ψ ∨ ¬ψ is a (classical hence)
LP logical truth, φ ∧ ¬φ Kalman ψ ∨ ¬ψ for any φ and ψ.5
In the classical case, as φ is not a contradiction, any interpolant χ is likewise
not a contradiction and, since ψ is not a tautology, χ is not a tautology. That
aside, the statement of the interpolation theorem gives us little to go on. Here I
prove a refinement of the theorem for the {∧,∨,¬}-fragment of classical propo-
sitional logic which tells us a little more: we can construct an interpolant that is
entailed by φ inK3 and entails ψ in LP . This is not a trivial consequence of the
interpolation properties of Kleene’s and Priest’s propositional logics, not least
because there are classically valid entailments that hold in neither K3 nor LP .
¬φ ∧ (φ ∨ ψ)  ¬χ ∨ (χ ∧ ψ) is one such. The result is more than a mere nov-
elty, for, arguably,K3 is what survives of classical propositional logic when one
gives up the joint exhaustiveness of truth and falsity and LP is what survives
when one gives up their mutual exclusivity.
2 Kleene’s and Priest’s three-valued logics
Kleene’s strong three-valued logic and Priest’s Logic of Paradox share the same
three-valued truth-tables for negation, conjunction and disjunction. These are:
φ ¬φ φ ∧ ψ 1 1/2 0 φ ∨ ψ 1 1/2 0
1 0 1 1 1/2 0 1 1 1 1
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1 1/2 1/2
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/2 0 .
The logics differ in that Kleene’s takes 1 to be the only designated value, Priest’s
takes 1 and 1/2 to be designated.
Following the notation of (Priest 1979), an assignment u of values to atomic
formulas extends to a valuationu+ on all formulas constructed employing nega-
tion, conjunction and disjunction in accordance with the truth-tables. We con-
sider no other formulas in what follows and no other valuations. (+ is an in-
jective function from assignments to valuations.) We restrict attention to in-
ferences with at most a single premise and take ‘’ to stand for classical con-
sequence, ‘K3’ to stand for preservation of the value 1 from premise to con-
clusion under all valuations, and ‘LP ’ to stand for preservation of the value 0
from conclusion to premise under all valuations.6
5Bendová (2005, p. 130, Remark 1) notes that requiring premise and conclusion to share an atom
does not remove all failures of interpolation in Kalman implication.
6φ Kalman ψ iff, under all valuations u+, u+(φ) ≤ u+(ψ).
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The Duality Principle stated above is an immediate consequence of these
definitions.
Looking at the truth-tables two points leap to the eye and can be shown
more formally by induction on length of formula:
◦ an assignment which assigns only 0 and/or 1 to atoms extends to a valu-
ation which assigns only 0 and 1 fully in classical fashion;
◦ an assignment which assigns only 1/2 to atoms extends to a valuation
which assigns only 1/2.
This second observation shows that Kleene’s logic (K3) has no theorems—no
formulamust take the value 1—and that Priest’s logic (LP ) has no anti-theorems—
no formula must take the value 0.
A third fact is almost equally obvious:
Lemma 1 Given assignments u and v, if v differs from u only in assigning the
value 1/2 to one or more atoms to which u assigns either 0 or 1, then, for all
formulas φ, v+(φ) = u+(φ) or v+(φ) = 1/2.
Proof The claim holds trivially for atoms. Suppose that it holds for all formulas
with k or fewer occurrences of connectives, and let φ contain k+ 1 occurrences
of connectives. Proof is by cases.
◦ φ is ¬ψ. Then v+(φ) = 1 − v+(ψ) and, by the induction hypothesis,
v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) or v+(ψ) = 1/2. Consequently, v+(φ) = 1−u+(ψ) = u+(φ)
or v+(φ) = 1− 1/2 = 1/2.
◦ φ is ψ ∧ χ. Then v+(φ) = min{v+(ψ), v+(χ)} and, by the induction hy-
pothesis, v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) or v+(ψ) = 1/2 and v+(χ) = u+(χ) or v+(χ) =
1/2. Consequently, v+(φ) = 1 = u+(φ) if v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) = 1 and
v+(χ) = u+(χ) = 1, v+(φ) = 0 = u+(φ) if v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) = 0 or
v+(χ) = u+(χ) = 0, and otherwise v+(φ) = 1/2.
◦ φ is ψ ∨ χ. Then v+(φ) = max{v+(ψ), v+(χ)} and, by the induction hy-
pothesis, v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) or v+(ψ) = 1/2 and v+(χ) = u+(χ) or v+(χ) =
1/2. Consequently, v+(φ) = 0 = u+(φ) if v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) = 0 and
v+(χ) = u+(χ) = 0, v+(φ) = 1 = u+(φ) if v+(ψ) = u+(ψ) = 1 or
v+(χ) = u+(χ) = 1, and otherwise v+(φ) = 1/2. 
An immediate consequence of this last lemma will do some work in what
follows:
4
Corollary 1.1 If a valuation u+ assigns only the values 0 and/or 1 to the mem-
bers of some set of formulas X then any valuation which agrees with u+ on
those atoms occurring in members of X to which the latter assigns 0 and 1
agrees with u+ on all members of X . 
This corollary yields a criterion for the existence of classical (two-valued)
valuations on sets of formulas:
Observation 1 If a valuation u+ assigns only the values 0 and/or 1 to the mem-
bers of some set of formulas X , there is a classical valuation which agrees with
u+ on those atoms occurring in members ofX to which the latter assigns 0 and
1 and agrees with u+ on all members of X .
From this it follows that all classical tautologies are theorems of LP (cf. Priest
1979, §III.8) and all classical contradictions are anti-theorems ofK3.
3 The refinement
Lemma 2 If φ  ψ then, when the valuation u+ assigns the value 1 to φ and the
valuation v+ assigns the value 0 to ψ, there is an atom p, common to φ and ψ
such that either u(p) = 1 and v(p) = 0 or u(p) = 0 and v(p) = 1.
Proof u 6= v, for were the same valuation to assign 1 to φ and 0 to ψ, by Obser-
vation 1 there would be a purely classical valuation making φ true and ψ false,
contrary to hypothesis.
u and v must, then, disagree but were their disagreement limited to these
four forms—
◦ u and v disagree on one or more atoms that occur in φ but not in ψ
◦ u and v disagree on one or more atoms that occur in ψ but not in φ
◦ u assigns the value 1/2 to one or more atoms common to φ and ψ to which
v assigns either 0 or 1
◦ v assigns the value 1/2 to one or more atoms common to φ and ψ to which
u assigns either 0 or 1
—we could define this assignment w:
◦ w agrees with u on atoms that occur in φ but not in ψ;
◦ w agrees with v on atoms that occur in ψ but not in φ;
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◦ w assigns what v assigns when u assigns the value 1/2 to one or more
atoms common to φ and ψ to which v assigns either 0 or 1;
◦ w assigns what u assigns when v assigns the value 1/2 to one or more
atoms common to φ and ψ to which u assigns either 0 or 1;
◦ elsewhere w agrees with u and v.
w extends to the valuation w+. As w differs from u on atoms occurring in φ
at most by assigning 0 or 1 where u assigns 1/2, by Corollary 1.1, w+(φ) =
u+(φ) = 1. Similarly, as w differs from v on atoms occurring in ψ at most by
assigning 0 or 1where v assigns 1/2, by Corollary 1.1 again, w+(ψ) = v+(ψ) =
0. And then, by Observation 1 and contrary to hypothesis, there is a classical
valuation under which φ is true and ψ is false.
Consequently, as claimed, there must be at least one atom p, common to φ
and ψ such that either u(p) = 1 and v(p) = 0 or u(p) = 0 and v(p) = 1. 
Theorem 1 If 2 ¬φ, 2 ψ and φ  ψ then there is a formula χ containing only
atoms common to φ and ψ and such that φ K3 χ and χ LP ψ.
Proof Firstly, since 2 ¬φ and 2 ψ, φ and ψ have at least one atom in common.
Secondly, as2 ¬φ, there is a classical valuation u+ such that u+(φ) = 1; likewise,
as 2 ψ, there is a classical valuation v+ such that v+(ψ) = 0. In the light of this
and Lemma 2, any valuation assigning either 1 to φ or 0 to ψ must assign either
0 or 1 to an atom common to φ and ψ.
Let p1, p2, . . . , pn be the atoms common to φ and ψ. Corresponding to an
assignment u, let χu be a conjunction of literals containing pi if u(pi) = 1, ¬pi if
u(pi) = 0, and simply ignoring pi if u(pi) = 1/2. Bywhat has just been observed,
there is always at least one conjunct when a valuation assigns either 1 to φ or 0
to ψ.
For each assignment u of values to just the atoms occurring in one or other
or both of φ and ψ, label it with a 1 if u+(φ) = 1, label it with a 0 if u+(ψ) = 0.
(As φ  ψ, each assignment bears at most one label.) Let χ1 be the disjunc-
tion of those conjunctions χu for which u is labelled with a 1 and let χ0 be the
disjunction of those conjunctions χu for which u is labelled with a 0.
Now, let u+ be a valuation for which u+(φ) = 1 and let u be the induced
assignment to just the atoms occurring in one or other or both of φ and ψ. By
construction, u+(χu) = 1 and hence u+(χ1) = 1. Thus φ K3 χ1. Next, let v+
be a valuation for which v+(ψ) = 0 and let v be the induced assignment to just
the atoms occurring in one or other or both of φ and ψ. It remains to show that
v+(χ1) = 0. By Lemma 2, for any valuation w+, inducing the assignment w on
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the atoms occurring in one or other or both of φ and ψ, for which w+(φ) = 1
there is an atom p, common to φ and ψ, such that either w(p) = 1 and v(p) = 0
or w(p) = 0 and v(p) = 1. In the first case, χw contains p and v+(χw) = 0; in the
second, χw contains¬p and again v+(χw) = 0. As this holds for all assignments
w labelled with a 1, v+(χ1) = 0. Thus χ1 LP ψ.
We have shown that
φ K3 χ1 and χ1 LP ψ.
¬χ0 (and thus χ1 ∧ ¬χ0 and χ1 ∨ ¬χ0) serves equally well as an interpolant
with the properties we seek. 
4 Conclusion
We have strengthened one form of the interpolation theorem for the {∧,∨,¬}-
fragment of classical propositional logic: when φ  ψ and when φ is not a clas-
sical contradiction and ψ is not a classical tautology, we have shown how to
construct an interpolant χ such that
φ K3 χ and χ LP ψ.
This cannot be further strengthened so as to read
if φ  ψ and at least one atom is common to φ and ψ then there is a
formula χ containing only atoms common to φ and ψ and such that
φ K3 χ and χ LP ψ.
(φ∧¬φ)∨ψ  (φ∨¬φ)∨χ but when φ, ψ and χ are distinct atoms, no formula
containing φ as sole atom is aK3-consequence of (φ ∧ ¬φ) ∨ ψ.
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Appendix: Interpolation Theorem for K3
Theorem 2 If φ 2K3 and φ K3 ψ then there is a formula χ employing only
atoms common to φ and ψ such that φ K3 χ and χ K3 ψ.
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Proof is by induction on the number of atoms occurring in φ that do not occur
in ψ. If that number is zero, φ itself serves as an interpolant, and this provides
the base case of the induction. Now suppose that an interpolant exists when
at mostm atoms occur in the premise but not in the conclusion—the induction
hypothesis—and suppose too that no more thanm+1 atoms occur in φ but not
in ψ. Let q be one of these and let p1, p2, . . . , pn be all other atoms occurring in
φ, at mostm of which do not occur in ψ.
Let φ1 be the formula obtained by replacing all occurrences of q in φ with
(p1 ∨ ¬p1) ∨ (p2 ∨ ¬p2) ∨ . . . ∨ (pn ∨ ¬pn); let φ2 be the formula obtained by
replacing all occurrences of q in φwith (p1∧¬p1)∧ (p2∧¬p2)∧ . . .∧ (pn∧¬pn).
We show, first, that φ1 ∨ φ2 K3 ψ, then that φ K3 φ1 ∨ φ2.
A valuation only assigns 1 to φ1 ∨ φ2 if it assigns 1 to one or other of φ1 and
φ2. Suppose first, then, that it assigns 1 to φ1. It can only do this by assigning 0
or 1 to at least one of p1, p2, . . . , pn, thus assigning 1 to (p1 ∨¬p1)∨ (p2 ∨¬p2)∨
. . .∨(pn∨¬pn); the valuation that differs at most by assigning 1 to q also assigns
1 to φ, and hence to ψ; as q doesn’t occur in ψ, the original valuation must also
assign 1 to ψ. Suppose next that our original valuation assigns 1 to φ2. It can
only do this by assigning 0 or 1 to at least one of p1, p2, . . . , pn, thus assigning 0
to (p1 ∧ ¬p1) ∧ (p2 ∧ ¬p2) ∧ . . . ∧ (pn ∧ ¬pn); the valuation that differs at most
by assigning 0 to q also assigns 1 to φ, and hence to ψ; again, as q doesn’t occur
in ψ, the original valuation must also assign 1 to ψ. Hence φ1 ∨ φ2 K3 ψ.
It remains to show that φ K3 φ1 ∨ φ2. Suppose that an assignment to p1,
p2, . . . , pn and q leads to assigning 1 to φ. At least one of the atoms must be
assigned 0 or 1. Were q alone to take one of these values, as it does not occur in
ψ the assignmentwhich assigns 1/2 to all atoms save q leads toψ itself taking the
value 1/2, contradicting our starting point that φ K3 ψ. So at least one among
p1, p2, . . . , pn takes one of the values 0 and 1 and hence (p1 ∨¬p1)∨ (p2 ∨¬p2)∨
. . . ∨ (pn ∨ ¬pn) takes the value 1 and (p1 ∧ ¬p1) ∧ (p2 ∧ ¬p2) ∧ . . . ∧ (pn ∧ ¬pn)
takes the value 0. If 1 is assigned to q, φ1 and hence φ1 ∨ φ2 takes the value 1;
if 0 is assigned to q, φ2 and hence φ1 ∨ φ2 takes the value 1; if q is assigned the
value 1/2 then, by Lemma 1, φ1 and φ2 and a fortiori their disjunction all take the
value 1. This completes the proof that φ K3 φ1 ∨ φ2.
Were it the case that φ1 ∨ φ2 K3 , so too would we have that φ K3 ,
but by hypothesis this is not so. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, as φ1 ∨ φ2
contains no more thanm atoms that do not occur in ψ, an interpolant exists for
φ1 ∨ φ2 and ψ and the same formula suffices for φ and ψ. This completes the
proof of the Interpolation Theorem for propositionalK3. 
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